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THE BERMUDA CAPACITY CLAUSES IN THE JET AGE
By JOHN C. MCCARROLLt
I. INTRODUCTION

INTERNATIONAL commercial aviation involves important political
interests even though permission to operate is ordinarily phrased in
terms of the commercial activities to be permitted.' The Chicago Conference in 1944 produced one important base of international aviation:
the International Air Services Agreement,' which allows planes of signatory states to enter national airspace and land for noncommercial purposes
but no agreement was reached on the exchange of commercial rights.3 The
dispute over economic regulation was finally settled in February 1946, by
an agreement signed at Bermuda between the United States and Great
Britain which is commonly called the Bermuda Agreement. In return for
Great Britain's retreat from demands for restrictions on the number of
flights each airline might fly (frequency controls) and on the number
of seats each airline could offer to a particular destination (capacity limitations) the United States, which had sought unregulated competition
on the international routes, accepted direct control of rates.4 It was
agreed that the prevailing rates would be those established by the International Air Transport Association.5 Other aspects of air service were
t Member of the New York Bar. This article was prepared from a paper, Regulation of Competition Among International Airlines, written for a seminar, International Business Regulation, given
by Professor Phillip E. Areeda at the Harvard Law School. The author's thanks are extended to
Professor Areeda for his helpful criticisms. This paper also formed the basis for Note, CAB Regulation of International Aviation, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 575 (1962). The author gratefully acknowledges
the permission of the Harvard Law Review to use the material which is common to both the Note
and this article.
'Activities of foreign scheduled commercial airlines for which the privilege is granted are
traditionally classified into five "freedoms." The first allows flight through the national skies;
the second allows landing for noncommercial purposes. The third and fourth freedoms permit
the foreign airline to land and discharge passengers and cargo from its home country in the
granting country and to reload passengers and cargo for its return trip respectively. Without
both, commercial flight between the two countries is impractical. The fifth freedom is the permission given by country C to country A's carrier, in the case of a flight from A to B to C, to
land traffic picked up at B or to pick up traffic at C, on the return flight, destined for B. Since
many of the passengers boarding at A can be expected to disembark at B, the flight to C may become uneconomical unless the airline can obtain passengers in B for C. Although the number of
flights to C could be limited to those which would be sustained economically by passengers
originating in A with C as their destination, the fifth freedom makes possible the establishment
of a network of airline routes rather than a limited system of flights between two countries. See
H. Smith, Airways Abroad 117 (1950); Report of the Task Force on National Aviation Goals,
Project Horizon 114 (1961)
(hereinafter cited as Task Force). Foreign airlines are usually not
granted the privilege, termed "cabotage," of loading passengers and cargo in a foreign country for
another destination within the same country. See Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., 1A Av. L. Rep. 5
22262 (CAB 1959). See generally, Hesse, Some Questions on Aviation Cabotage, 1 McGill L.J.
129 (1953).
Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693, E.A.S. No. 487. Fifty-nine nations have now adhered to this convention. See Dep't of State, Treaties in Force 222 (1962).
a Great Britain and the United States were in almost total disagreement. Compare I Department
of State, Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference 55-63 (1948) (American proposal),
with id. at 63-74 (British proposal).
4
Air Services Agreement with the United Kingdom, Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499, T.I.A.S. No.
1507.
' Air Services Agreement with The United Kingdom, supra note 4 Annex II (d). IATA, a
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limited only by general provisions.6 The Bermuda Agreement provided the
model for a network of bilateral agreements exchanging commercial aviation privileges that encompasses the non-Communist world.7
For the most part international aviation has prospered under the compromise reached at Bermuda and the rates set by IATA. Although commercial aviation in general has expanded greatly since the end of World
War II, international operations have expanded faster than the average.
Occasional dissatisfaction with the level of rates, the routes exchanged, or
capacity limitations imposed by some countries had appeared to be disagreement on details rather than with the principles underlying the Bermuda Agreement. Within the past few years, however, the principles
established at the close of World War II have been strained, and there are
indications that these principles, at least as applied until now, may no
longer be adequate for the development of international aviation.
With the introduction of jet planes, the available capacity increased
rapidly. The North Atlantic, the most important airway for international
aviation, exemplifies the problems. Traffic carried across this route has
risen steadily. But with the introduction of jets in 1959, the capacity
offered has risen even more rapidly.' In the past decade all airlines have
expanded the number of frequencies offered, and the number of airlines
flying across the North Atlantic has increased from eleven in 1951 to
nineteen in 1960."' The greater number of seats in each plane means more
capacity for the same number of frequencies. Yet because the individual
passenger is more interested in the availability of schedules than total
private association of carriers, which now includes the major international carriers, was revived
by the carriers in the spring of 1945, following the disagreement, at the Chicago Conference about
regulation of international commercial aviation. IATA: The First Three Decades, 9 IATA Bull.
11, 42-44 (1949); Sheehan, The IATA Traffic Conferences, 7 Sw. L.J. 135, 137 (1953). For
a list of IATA members, see IATA Member Airlines, World Air Transport Statistics 2-3 (1961).
Rates are set by the carriers, subject to later government approval. If no agreement is reached,
either because of carrier disagreement or government disapproval, carriers may file separate tariffsopen rates. Generally IATA has been able to agree on rates. See Note, CAB Regulation of
International Aviation, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 575, 577-79 (1962). The difficulties which may arise
if the agreed procedure fails were well illustrated by the recent struggle between the CAB and
the air ministries of several European countries over the desirability of a fare increase. See N.Y.
Times, May 15, 1963, p. 1, col. 3; id., May 16, 1963, p. 1, col. 4.
6 Final Act of The Civil Aviation Conference, Air Services Agreement with The United Kingdom, supra note 5, at 18-19.
E.g., Air Transport Services Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, July 7, 1955,
[1956] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 527, T.I.A.S. No. 3536; Air Transport Agreement Between Austria
and Switzerland, Dec. 19, 1949, 254 U.N.T.S. 287; see van der Tuuk Adriani, The "Bermuda"
Capacity Clauses, 22 J. Air L. & Com. 406-09 (1955). The Air Transport Services Agreement
with the Federal Republic of Germany, supra, is typical of the straight Bermuda-Type Agreements
signed by the United States.
SBetween 1952 and 1960 scheduled domestic traffic, as reported to the International Civil
Aviation Organization, has increased by a little more than 200% while international aviation has
almost trebled. See Development of Civil Aviation-1952-1960, 5 IATA World Air Transport
Statistics 6 (1960); cf. 1960 CAB Ann. Rep. 63.
'See North Atlantic Traffic-Summary, 1951-1960, 5 IATA World Air Transport Statistics
35-36 (1960). The trend has continued at least into the first part of 1962; in February the
number of passengers carried on the North Atlantic was 17.7% above the previous year but the
number of seats had risen 25.9%. N.Y. Times, April 2, 1962, p. 45, col. 7.
" See North Atlantic Traffic of IATA Members, 5 IATA World Air Transport Statistics 35
(1960) (listing 18 member lines). Loftleidir, an independent, has operated since 1954. IATA
defines the North Atlantic as the routes between Europe and the United States and Canada.
See id. at 35. The CAB Bureau Counsel, evidently using a slightly different means for ascertaining
the year a carrier begins operations, indicates 8 carriers operating across the North Atlantic to
the United States in 1951 and 17 in 1961. Two Canadian carriers are not included in the CAB
total. Exhibit BC-13, CAB Investigation.
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capacity, provided the latter is sufficient to provide him with a seat, the
airlines have little incentive to decrease the number of frequencies offered. 1
The American carriers have expressed particular concern about the decline in the amount of traffic carried by American carriers from better than
sixty per cent in 1950 to less than forty per cent in 1960." This argument
conjures up the memory of American merchant marine and stresses the following factors increasing competition. Cities like Amsterdam and Copenhagen have developed "into important international gateways through
which they attract a large volume of fifth-freedom, or 'beyond' traffic.""
Perhaps American carriers cannot cover all such cities as well as they do
the major gateways: London, Paris, Frankfurt, and Rome. Four of the
new lines represent countries previously without a carrier across the
Atlantic. 4 Most of these countries were previously served by the United
States." Qantas Empire Airways and Air India International, the two new
lines not representing either a European or an American country, compete
from New York to the major gateways and divert little if any traffic
from the secondary gateways." It should be noted, however, that diversion
is not a complete explanation; much of the decline in the American share
of traffic carried represents traffic lost by Trans World Airways which has
been unable to offer effective competition because of internal dissension."
The problem of overcapacity has affected international commercial aviation generally, and almost all carriers have suffered. Reactions to this
economic malaise accompanying the excess capacity have varied. First,
some have urged significant rate cuts to generate new traffic." Second,
various lines and countries, particularly in Europe, have considered forms
of multi-national and interline cooperation. " Third, the European countries
have demanded access to interior American cities, considered by the American carriers to be domestic markets. They argue that the United States
policy of seeking equal economic value in traffic rights received for
American lines in return for the grants given foreign lines is outmoded
and that their lines should have the same freedom of access to the United
States market that American carriers have to the European market."
Finally, there has been a renewed tendency to resort to capacity restrictions
11In 1960 the number of flights on the North Atlantic declined 2.6% but the number of
seats offered rose by almost 36%. North Atlantic Traffic-Summary by Directions, 1951-1960,
5 IATA World Air Transport Statistics 37, 39 (1960).
"Task Force 107.
"Task Force 116.
"'Loftleidir, Deutsche Lufthansa, Aerlinte Eirean, and Iberia. Austria, Poland, and Saudia
Arabia have been reported to be considering seeking permission to fly across the Atlantic also.
N.Y. Times, April 1, 1962, § 5, p. 15, col. 1.
"See
Lufthansa Exhibit 5, CAB Investigation (showing the decline in the percentage of
traffic carried by American carriers to Germany since Lufthansa began transatlantic service).
"°See Air Transport Agreement with India, Feb. 3, 1956, 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 275, 287,
T.I.A.S. No. 3504 at 13; Air Transport Agreement with Australia, Dec. 3, 1946; annex § 2,
61 Star. 2470, T.I.A.S. No. 1574, as amended, Aug. 12, 1957, 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1334, T.I.A.S.
No. 3880; Official Airline Guide, March, 1962, pp. C-484, C-734 (World-Wide ed.). Since this
paper was written, Pakistan International Airways has initiated flights to Europe and on to the
United States.
7
" See Hughes Tool Co., CAB Order No. E-16195, Dec. 29, 1960. Recent changes in management have alleviated TWA's internal problems, at least for the time being, and in 1962, its
international operations had revived considerably. See [1962] TWA Ann. Rep. 5.
"See, e.g., Hildred, Annual Report of the Director General, 28 IATA Bull. 31, 41 (1960).
"'See, e.g., Comment, 22 Rev. Gfnfrale De L'Air 188 (1959) (report on the discussion concerning Air Union, a proposed pool of the international operations of several European lines). Such
organizations could not be easily assimilated to a framework based on bilateral relations.
"See N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1957, § 2, p. 32, col. 4.
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when national lines are in trouble.2" This tendency is noticeable even in
the United States where the concern both in the industry and in the government" over a sagging share of the market may be leading towards a
more restrictive American policy towards commercial freedoms. This
article will consider the service provisions of the Bermuda-Type Agreements, and their relations to restrictions imposed on the service international lines can offer, particularly certain amendments proposed by the
Civil Aeronautics Board for inclusion in the permits of all foreign lines.
II.

THE BERMUDA-TYPE AGREEMENTS

A. Third and Fourth Freedom Trafic
The bilateral agreements form the framework of inter-national aviation.
The basic unit of airline routes is the permission to carry traffic between
pairs of countries-the third and fourth freedoms (permission to discharge passengers from the home country and land passengers for the
return trip, respectively). Ordinarily, country A grants the airlines designated by country B permission to fly from any point in country B to certain specific cities or airports within A; conversely, B allows the carriers
designated by A to fly from anywhere in A to specified points in B. In
describing the terms of competition, most agreements have provisions
similar to Article Eight which provides that "there shall be a fair and
equal opportunity for the airlines of each contracting party to operate
on any route specified." 3 A literal reading of this language would
permit the flag carriers of one country to fly all routes flown between the
two states by the lines of the other, but such an interpretation would be
clearly inconsistent with the grant of specific routes.
When the United States and Great Britain signed the Bermuda Agreement in 1946, the terms were drafted to exclude limitations upon the
competition for third and fourth freedom traffic on the routes granted;
4
and the two countries have consistently affirmed that construction."
5
Article
and
Furthermore, Article Two" grants general commercial rights,
Ten" imposes some limitations on those rights only with respect to the
21 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1960, p. 43, col. 1 (JAL expected to seek restrictions to
combat Pan American's jet competition); id., Jan. 12, 1960, p. 42, col. 1 (Polish government
restricts BEA's use of jets to protect the Polish line).
" See, e.g., Hearings on International Air Transportation Problems Before the Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1961); Task Force
107.23 Unless
otherwise indicated all reference to portions of the Bermuda-Type
Agreements refer to
the sections of the Air Transport Services Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, July
7, 1955, [1956] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 527, T.I.A.S. No. 3536.
24See Brief for Petitioner, BOAC v. CAB, 304 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Hearings on S.
1814 Before the Senate Committee on Inter-State and Foreign Commerce, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 65
(1946); Task Force 115-16; International Air-Transport Policy, Joint Statement by U. S. and
British Governments, 15 Dep't State Bull. 577 (1946); Masefield, Some Aspects of Anglo-American
Civil Aviation, United Empire, Jan-Feb. 1947, p. 29-30.
2' Art. 2 reads:
(1) Each contracting party grants to the other contracting party rights necessary
for the conduct of international air services by the designated airlines, as follows:
the rights of transit, of stops for non-traffic purposes, and of commercial entry
and departure for international traffic in passengers, mail and cargo at the points in
its territory named on each of the routes specified in accordance with paragraph (2).
(2) The routes over which the designated airlines of the two contracting parties
will be authorized to operate will be specified in a Route Schedule, mutually agreed
upon, and set forth in an exchange of diplomatic notes.
26 Art. 10 reads:
(1) The air services made available to the public by the airlines operating under
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carriage of fifth freedom traffic (traffic coming from or destined for a
third country). The absence of similar restrictions on the carriage of third
and fourth freedom traffic supports the reading that it is to be unrestricted. To support such a liberal interpretation of the agreements,
Article Eight should be read as forbidding only actions designed to favor
the national carrier or to deprive a foreign line of the opportunity to
compete for the traffic on the routes granted to its government.
This liberal interpretation has not, however, received universal acceptance. Countries concerned about the ability of national carriers to
compete have favored a more restrictive reading: "[Flair and equal opportunity . . . to operate" should mean not simply the absence of legal
impediments but equality of practical capability to compete. They argue
that, if one carrier's competitive position is too strong, the other may be
unable to compete unless the dominant carrier is handicapped. The carrier
to be protected might be allowed to charge lower rates, but the means
of equalization ordinarily used is some limitation on frequency."7 Article
Nine"8 which prohibits operations which "affect unduly" the service of
local or regional carriers supports this restrictive construction of Article
Eight. Nonetheless, any such restrictive interpretation is contrary to the
understanding of the parties to the Bermuda Agreement.
It is possible for particular agreements to be properly construed in a
restrictive fashion. In an agreement between the United States and India,
providing that airlines shall obtain the prior approval of the Indian government for any frequency changes,"8 a contemporaneous letter agreement gave Indian carriers practical equality of competitive opportunity.
This would seem to be consistent with the bilateral. However, the Amerithis Agreement shall bear a close relationship to the requirements of the public for
such services.
(2) It is the understanding of both contracting parties that services provided by a
designated airline under the present Agreement shall retain as their primary objective
the provision of capacity adequate to the traffic demands between the country of
which such airline is a national and the countries of ultimate destination of the traffic.
The right to embark or disembark on such services international traffic destined for
or coming from third countries at a point or points on the routes specified in
accordance with paragraph (2) of Article 2 of this Agreement shall be applied in
accordance with the general principles of orderly development to which both contracting parties subscribe and shall be subject to the general principle that capacity
should be related:
a) to traffic requirements between the country of origin and the countries of
ultimate destination of the traffic;
b) to the requirements of through airline operation; and,
c) to the traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes after
taking account of local and regional services.
* E.g., Air Services Agreement Between France and the Union of South Africa, Sept. 17,
1954, art. 9, 216 U.N.T.S. 29, 34, as modified, Sept. 24, 1956, 254 U.N.T.S. 414; see Hearings
Before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 315 (1959). A variation on this
theme is the establishment of a formula allowing frequency or capacity increases when a predetermined amount is carried and requiring decreases when less than a minimum is carried. See,
e.g., Air Services Agreement Between Spain and Peru, March 31, 1954, annex, 232 U.N.T.S. 65
(based on load factors). Such a restriction is tied to existing demand and hinders services
designed to develop additional traffic.
"SArt. 9 states:
In the operation by the airlines of either contracting party of the air services over
the routes described in accordance with paragraph (2) of Article 2 of this Agreement,
the interest of the .irlines of the other contracting party shall be taken into consideration so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provide on all or part of
the same routes.
2
Air Transport Agreement with India, Feb. 3, 1956, 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 275, 301, T.I.A.S. No.
3504 at 28.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
can rejection of prior controls and the inclusion of a specific provision
for the review of capacity increases, which were included in the agreement with Mexico, indicate a contrary intent. Therefore recent Mexican
refusals to permit Pan American to increase its scheduled flights on the
route from Miami to Mexico City seem to be unwarranted.
Whether capacity or frequency limitations are warranted by the bilateral
is not so important a question as whether they are needed by smaller
countries to protect a national need. Smaller countries with fledgling
international lines have little to lose from a deadlock with a larger
country about operating rights, and they will probably be able either to
impose these controls in practice or to negotiate treaties with modifications permitting such controls. Despite their favorable bargaining position, these states cannot control competition by limiting the routes granted. A small State may have only one or two cities of commercial importance, and denial of access to such major cities makes a route exchange
unattractive to the other country. Nonetheless, even if the validity of the
interest in protecting national flag lines is assumed, frequency and capacity
restrictions are sufficiently deleterious of international aviation to suggest
the desirability of another means of affording the same protection. When
frequency restrictions are imposed, the service available to the public is
held to a level which will permit the least efficient carrier concerned to
operate. Therefore the need for prior approval of any schedule increases
or of the use of improved equipment will probably cause the supply of
services to lag behind demand rather than preceding and perhaps developing demand.

B. Fifth Freedom Traffic
Although carriers are afforded full freedom to compete for third and
fourth freedom traffic under the Bermuda-Type Agreements, Article Ten
imposes restrictions on the carriage of traffic to or from third countriesthe fifth freedom:
services provided by a designated airline under the present Agreement shall
retain as their primary objective the provision of capacity adequate to the
traffic demands between the country of which such airline is a national and
the countries of ultimate destination of the traffic. The right [to carry fifth
freedom traffic] . . . shall be subject to the general principle that capacity
should be related:
a) to traffic requirements between the country of origin and the countries of
ultimate destination of the traffic;
b) to the requirements of through airline operation; and
c) to the traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes
after taking account of local and regional services.
The United States had sought fifth freedom rights for its carriers because long-distance, multi-stop flights would be uneconomic without
picking up passengers to replace those who had disembarked at intermediate stops.30 Subsection (b) reflects this underlying basis for the grant
of fifth freedom rights. It gives a carrier the right to carry enough fifth

freedom traffic to make some minimum number of flights economically
feasible.
Subsection (c)
30 See supra note 1.

also appears to have limited application. If it means
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that fifth freedom traffic should be carried only when regional and local
services are inadequate, the clause would nullify in many cases the grant
of fifth freedom rights. A more qualified meaning that the carrier's fifth
freedom carriage shall not unduly divert traffic from local and regional
services seems to add little to the meaning which can be given to clause
(a). Rather than imposing a limit on fifth freedom carriage, the clause
would seem to permit a carrier to offer greater fifth freedom service than
would ordinarily be proper when local service is non-existent or insufficient to satisfy the available demand. 1 The major interpretative disagreements have concerned the meaning to be given clause (a) and the
phrase "primary justification."
Until recently there has been no systematic application of any definition
for determining the amount of fifth freedom traffic carried by a carrier
or for enforcing the relation between primary justification traffic and
fifth freedom passengers." The early attempts to define fifth freedom
carriage floundered on the inability to define what constituted a single
trip.
In some cases nations have reacted to conduct felt to be in violation
of the governing treaty by unilaterally halting or restricting operations.
For example Brazil in late 1961, denounced the bilaterals with the Scandinavian countries, but before the notification period had expired, she
suspended the commercial privileges of the Scandinavian Airlines System
entirely for a short period because the inauguration of jet service was
thought to be a violation of the agreement. SAS was later permitted
to resume service but only with greatly restricted operating rights. 4
The CAB has now begun to formulate its interpretation of Article
Ten.3" According to this definition, a passenger's ultimate destination is
the furthest point on the trip measured by a great circle route. Thus, a
passenger would be third freedom traffic for airlines of the country where
he first boards and fourth freedom traffic for the furthest country from
his point of origin. Even if the trip is composed of many short stopovers
of approximately equal duration, the "ultimate destination" is the country
furthest from the point of origin. To implement this definition, the CAB
wants traffic carried on trips covered by single tickets classified according
to its true origin and destination as shown by the ticket or waybill."
Once the statistics are available, an attempt can be made to police the
ratio of fifth freedom to primary justification traffic. It is further contended that if primary is to be given meaning, it must require at least
that the primary justification traffic be more than the secondary traffic.
Although several other interpretations have been suggested, the most
.'Cf. Lineas Aereas Constarricenses, S.A., 26 C.A.B. 429, 431, 437 (1958). Wassenbergh
indicates that the first definition suggested has been used by some countries with the expected
dampening effects. Wassenbergh, Post-War International Civil Aviation Policy and the Law of
the Air 58 (1957).
3 See Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A., 25 C.A.B. 59, 73 (1957) (examiner's report).
" See Wassenbergh, op. cit. supra note 31, at 49-52.
"4Aviation Daily, Feb. 28, 1962, p. 373; id., March 12, 1962, p. 31. Mexican objections to
Pan American schedules, discussed at TAN 29 supra, are partly based on objections to what
is considered excessive fifth-freedom carriage. Id., March 9, 1962, p. 59.
" See, e.g., Aviation Week, Dec. 26, 1960, p. 30.
" See Exhibit BC-3, CAB Investigation.
" Examples offered by the CAB Bureau Counsel indicate that the proposed CAB power might
be exercised in situations where the primary justification traffic constitutes only 25o or 30%.
Rebuttal Exhibit BC-2, pp. 1, 4, CAB Investigation; but it seems likely that the Bureau Counsel
is illustrating only a clear case.
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important alternative to this interpretation is that a passenger's origin and
destination should be determined by the point where the passenger boards
and deplanes on a particular flight even though the flight is but a segment
of a longer trip." It would seem that a stop simply to change planes, one
in which the passenger does not pass through customs or perhaps does not
stop more than a few hours, should not constitute a destination and new
origin even under this definition. Any longer stopover in a country does
make the passenger third or fourth freedom traffic for that country. Thus
if one travels from A to B and then a day later travels on to C, the
carriage of that passenger from B to C is third freedom for the lines of
B, fourth freedom for those of C, and fifth freedom for A's lines.
Because United States citizens still constitute a majority of the world's
air travelers," and because most Americans make multi-stop trips, the
reason for the difference in definitions is clear. India has used this brokenvoyage definition to justify continued restrictions on American flights because the amount of traffic moving directly between the United States and
India, the only primary justification traffic under this interpretation, is
small.
More important from the United States standpoint is the definition's
relevance to North Atlantic traffic. The United States argues that some
European lines offer an excessive number of frequencies from their countries to the United States and can do so because the passengers have a
true origin or destination in other countries reached by the foreign line's
connecting flights. Because the national carriers can blanket these routes,
American carriers are handicapped in competing on routes to these countries and are deprived also of traffic which would normally be carried on
other routes." Such carriage is defended on the grounds that the stopover
makes the passenger third and fourth freedom traffic for the country
concerned.'
III.

SERVICE REGULATION BY THE UNITED STATES

A. CAB Proposals
Early in 1961 the CAB took the first steps to permit the enforcement of its proposed interpretation of Article Ten. It proposed to
amend all foreign-air-carrier permits to require all foreign air carriers
to "furnish traffic data to the Board and submit their schedules for
approval by the Board."" Without a foreign-air-carrier permit issued by
43
the CAB, no foreign airline may fly into the United States. In granting
such permits the CAB is directed by the Federal Aviation Act to consider
the applicant's qualifications along with the public interest." Permits have
ordinarily been issued to a foreign carrier as a matter of course after
" See Aviation Week, Dec. 26, 1960, p. 30.
"9Exhibit BC-4, CAB Investigation.
" See Task Force 116.
4'Wassenbergh, op. cit. supra note 31, at 71. Analytically such traffic may be distinguished
from ordinary fifth-freedom traffic because carriage from points not on the routes granted is
involved. But the carrier of the intermediate country is carrying traffic which would be primary
justification traffic for the terminal countries but for the diversion. It is not at all clear that
article ten is limited to third countries on the route. Article Ten, perhaps, should be read as
applying to third-country carriage when either terminus is on the granted route.
" CAB Order No. E-16288 (Jan. 18, 1961), CAB Investigation (order initiating the proceeding).
"'Federal Aviation Act § 402(a), 72 Stat. 757, 49 U.S.C. § 1372(a) (1958).
44Federal Aviation Act § 402(b), 72 Stat. 758, 49 U.S.C. § 1372(b) (1958).
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negotiations between the carrier's government and the State Department
have been completed."5 When issuing a permit, the CAB is empowered to
attach "such reasonable terms, conditions, or limitations, as . . . the public
interest may require."" The CAB seeks through the exercise of this power
to attach terms or conditions to control the service offered by the foreign
airlines.
Most conditions that the CAB has imposed, such as requiring the carrier to conform to American safety regulations," have expressed merely
the agreement reached between the two countries. The CAB has, however, used this power to further policy objectives related to statutory
policy. For example, acting on the theory that the Act does not contemplate operation by a United States citizen under a foreign-air-carrier
permit, 8 the CAB has used permit conditions to restrict control by
Americans of foreign carriers. Nevertheless, permits have been granted to
such controlled carriers when the CAB found no injury to the public
interest or where the foreign country had no other airline it could designate to fly the routes granted. 9 But in at least one case the CAB has
imposed conditions on the permit to minimize the effect of control of a
foreign line by an American carrier; the controlled carrier was forbidden
to disclose its connection with the American carrier in any advertising,
and the American carrier was forbidden to act as agent for the sale of
tickets on the controlled carrier's routes." In the past the CAB has also
used conditions in permits to achieve a result not expressly authorized
by either the statute or the applicable air service agreement. Since 1951,
permits issued to foreign air carriers have been conditioned on the
carrier's agreement to waive the defense of sovereign immunity in a suit
brought in the United States upon any occurrence arising out of a flight
authorized by the permit."
45 See N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1959, p. 36, col. 2. Once a Bermuda-Type Agreement is signed, the
exchange of routes can be initiated by either party. American carriers are usually first certificated
by the CAB; the State Department then opens negotiations with the other country to obtain the
necessary landing permission. If the other country seeks permission to land here, its diplomatic
representatives first make contact with the State Department. In the negotiations, the State Department consults the CAB and through it interested American carriers; not infrequently, a
CAB representative is included in the negotiating team. Once an exchange of routes is concluded,
a country may designate a line or lines to fly the route. This line must then apply to the CAB
for a foreign-air-carrier permit. See generally Hearings on the Independent Offices Appropriations
for 1961 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
488 (1960); Calkins, The Role of the CAB in the Grant of Operating Rights in Foreign Air
Carriage, 22 J. Air. L. & Com. 253 (1955). Examples of the circumstances under which the
CAB will grant a permit to a line not designated under an international agreement are Transportes
Aereos Nacionales, S.A., 25 C.A.B. 59 (1957) (no agreement with Honduras, flight between the
two countries continuing on a reciprocity basis); P. G. Taylor Proprietary, Ltd., 25 C.A.B. 109
(1957) (non-scheduled flight by an Australian company to south seas islands too small to sustain
scheduled flights); Balair AG, IA Av. L. Rep. 5 21085 (CAB 1960) (supplemental carrier
certificated to enable Swissair to operate an uninterrupted schedule).
46
47 Federal Aviation Act § 402(e), 72 Stat. 758, 49 U.S.C. § 1372(a) (1958).
E.g., Sabena, 26 C.A.B. 659 (1958). Limitations agreed upon between the countries in
negotiations prior to certification will also be included in permits. E.g., Pacific W. Airlines, Ltd.,
26 C.A.B. 653 (1958) (non-scheduled airlines).
48 See Federal Aviation Act §§ 101(3), 101(19), 401, 72 Stat. 737-38, 754, 49 U.S.C.
55 1301(3), 1301(19), 1371 (1958). American carriers are required to obtain certificates of
convenience and necessity from the CAB to fly international routes. Federal Aviation Act § 401 (a),
72 Stat. 754, 49 U.S.C § 1371(a) (1958).
49TACA Int'l. Airlines, S.A., 18 C.A.B. 737 (1954); Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 12
C.A.B. 232 (1950); cf. Canadian Pac. Air Lines, Ltd., 10 C.A.B. 138 (1949).
5'Havana-New York Foreign Air Carrier Permit Case, 14 C.A.B. 399 (1951); see Aerovias
Venezolanas, S.A., 20 C.A.B. 746 (1955).
" E.g., "El-Al" Israel Airlines, Ltd., 14 C.A.B. 962 (1951).
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In the course of proceedings on its proposed regulations the CAB
determined that it has the power to condition foreign-air-carrier permits
to require the carriers to file traffic statistics and, whenever the CAB
finds "that the public interest so demands," to submit flight schedules to
the Board for its approval." A statutory amendment allowing the Board
to suspend the effectiveness of a foreign carrier's proposed rates is also
being considered." If the power to impose such conditions is sustained, the
Board can expand its authority over international travel by attaching
further conditions to foreign-air-carrier permits whenever the public interest, in its view, so requires and the President approves.
An attempt by the CAB to extend by conditions, its authority to
matters over which no substantive authority is given by either the act
or an applicable bilateral may be an illegal use of the Board's power to
condition in the public interest. Moreover, the reach of statutory authority
varies depending on the nature of the flight and the nationality of the
carrier. An early congressional proposal for aviation regulation made no
distinction between interstate and international flights; provisions for
regulation applied to foreign and domestic carriers alike."4 The bill enacted,
however, distinguished both between interstate and international transportation" s and between domestic and foreign carriers."
In opposing the proposed conditions, the foreign carriers argued that
a comparison of the detailed regulation to which the domestic carriers are
subject with the relative freedom accorded foreign carriers indicates a
congressional intent to leave foreign carriers unregulated. The CAB rejected this argument and ruled that the provision for conditioning permits indicates a congressional intent to leave such questions to the Board's
discretion." While this may be sound, it does not necessarily follow that
Congress left equal discretion for all types of regulation.
The need for economic data from foreign carriers can be sufficiently
related to the Board's functions under the statute of approving IATA
agreements and advising the President and State Department about the
economic consequences of route exchanges to justify such a condition. 8
At the other extreme, an attempt to regulate rates by permit condition
would conflict with implied limitations contained in the statute. In contrast to the statutory silence on the filing of traffic data by foreign carriers,
the act explicitly sets forth the CAB's authority with regard to rates in
foreign air transportation. In view of the provision granting the Board
"Proposed Reg. 213.6, 26 Fed. Reg. 796 (1961); CAB Order No. E-17235 (July 27, 1961),
CAB Investigation.
53 Hearings on International Air Transportation Problems Before the Aviation Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1961).
54 See S. 3027, 74 Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), quoted in Hearings on the Transport of Passengers
and Property by Aircraft Before a Subcommittee on the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-14 (1935).
"Compare Federal Aviation Act § 1002(d), 72 Stat. 789, 49 U.S.C. 5 1482(d) (1958),
with § 1002(f), 72 Stat. 789, 49 U.S.C. § 1482(f) (1958).
"Compare Federal Aviation Act § 401, 72 Stat. 754, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1958), with 5
402, 72 Stat. 757, 49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1958).
'"CAB Order No. E-17235 (July 27, 1961), CAB Investigation.
"sCf. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961). In this case, the
Supreme Court held that the FPC could consider, in determining whether an application was in
the public interest, matters that it had no power to regulate directly. Congress had intended
that the entire field of natural gas production and distribution be regulated either by the states
or the FPC; the extension of FPC consideration was held necessary to effectuate this overriding
purpose.
"Federal Aviation Act § 1002(f), 72 Stat. 789, 49 U.S.C. § 1482(f) (1958).
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full authority to set domestic rates, the provision limiting the Board's
power with respect to rates in foreign air transportation to the elimination
of discrimination would appear to circumscribe the Board's power over
international rates. That the CAB has been able to exert influence over
international rates through its power to disapprove IATA resolutions is
irrelevant. Such power is concerned largely with the anti-trust implications of agreements; a requirement that an exemption from the anti-trust
laws be in the public interest compels an examination of economic effects
if the agreement establishes rates. The power to regulate service (the equipment used, frequencies flown, or class of carriage offered) by disapproving
proposed schedules falls in between these powers. On the one hand, service
regulation is not closely related to any specific Board function. But the explicit denial of the power to restrict the equipment used or frequencies
flown by domestic carriers by condition in certificates of convenience and
necessity" suggests that such restrictions would otherwise be an appropriate condition. Thus, where there is no bilateral, the statute does
not seem to bar permit conditions to restrict capacity. The proposed conditions go even further and would allow the CAB to disapprove schedules
without notice or hearing. Such procedure would conflict with the
statutory requirement that permit changes be made after notice and
hearing.6
The Federal Aviation Act further provides that the Board shall exercise
its powers in harmony with the obligations assumed by the United States
in any treaty or agreement with a foreign country; 2 presumably this
precludes the insertion of any condition that directly contravenes the
bilateral agreement between the United States and the foreign carrier's
country. Although the United States has negotiated some agreements
which specifically provide that the American carrier will supply statistics,6'
many countries require the filing of various statistics without a specific
grant of such power in the bilaterals, 4 and such a requirement would not
seem inconsistent with the bilaterals which make carriers subject to all
laws and regulations normally applied"' and are otherwise silent. However the Bermuda-Type Agreements do have specific provisions for disagreements about rates and capacity,"6 and permit conditions giving
the granting country power unilaterally to regulate either would seem
inconsistent with these provisions. It might be argued that Article Eleven
contemplates the CAB's possession of power over rates, but this article
does not permit the exercise of such power over foreign carrier rates.
The CAB has contended that the mere inclusion of these conditions is
6

°Federal Aviation Act § 401 (e), 72 Stat. 754, 49 U.S.C. 1371 (e)

65Federal Aviation Act § 402(f), 72 Stat. 758, 49 U.S.C. § 1372(f)
6

(1958).
(1958).

Federal Aviation Act § 1102, 72 Stat. 797, 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1958).
E.g., Air Transport Service Agreement with Mexcio, Aug. 15, 1960, art. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 4675.
4 See Exhibits PA-1, PA-2 (Pan-American), CAB Investigation (traffic data and scheduling
filing requirements with which Pan American must comply). The use of such data and statistics
apparently varies from country to country, from estimating traffic flow at airports to capacity
and frequency control.
65
Art. 5(2):
The laws and regulations of one contracting party relating to the admission to
or departure from its territory of passengers, crew, or cargo of aircraft, such as
regulations relating to entry, clearance, immigration, passports, customs, and
quarantine shall be complied with by or on behalf of such passengers, crew or cargo
of the other contracting party upon entrance into or departure from, and while
within the territory of the first contracting party.
66
Art. 10, supra note 26.
65
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not a violation, and that only an exercise of the powers in a manner inconsistent with the agreement would constitute a violation." Unless the
conditions contemplate unilateral action, however, they would seem to
have no purpose because any action acceptable to the foreign country involved would be enforced by that country. It is exactly such unilateral
action which would be a violation of the Bermuda-Type Agreements. The
Board further argued that, even if the use of the proposed conditions
would be contrary to a Bermuda-Type Agreement, the Board could impose
the condition because there might not be an applicable bilateral in force
when the powers were needed. 8 But such a possibility does not justify
present imposition of conditions on those carriers now covered by a
Bermuda-Type Agreement. The bilaterals require notice of intention to
terminate some months, usually one year, before the termination becomes
operative, and this period would allow time for the Board to amend the
carrier's permit and still be able to exercise the powers when the bilateral
ceases to act as a bar.
B. A Proposed Interpretationof Article Ten
The definition of primary justification traffic in the Bermuda-Type
Agreements recognizes the interest of both the country where the trip
originates and the traveler's destination. Any interpretation of this allocation of traffic must consider the multi-national pattern of international
aviation if the result is to be realistic. There is, for example, an arbitrary
quality to the Indian argument that an American traveler ceases to be
primary justification traffic for American carriers because he has stopped
on the way to India. In a personal sense, he probably still thinks of his
trip as originating in the United States. Further, the contacts of the trip
are still very much American. All portions of the trip were planned in
the United States; the traveler's intent is to return to the United States;
and the United States is the direct source of payment for the entire trip.
Therefore while it is impractical to weigh the contacts of each individual
trip, the interest of the traveler's home country as the originating country
in this type of trip should be recognized.
The interpretation offered by the CAB also has an arbitrary quality and
involves logical difficulties. If on a trip covered by a single ticket a
passenger flies from A to D with intermediate stopovers at B and C, the
American construction classifies him as third freedom for A, his true
origin. If D's line carried our traveler, it would be on the return trip from
A to D, and parity of reasoning suggests he is fourth freedom traffic for
D (assuming that D is the furthest country from A) on all legs of the
trip. What is his status for B and C? It would be incongruous and probably unacceptable to the intermediate countries to assert that neither B
nor C could classify him as primary justification traffic for any portion
of the trip. In addition, if the D carrier is not permitted to fly between
B and C, only A's flag line would be entitled to include him as a part of
its primary justification traffic on that leg. Furthermore, if the time spent
in B or C is approximately equal to or greater than that spent in D, it is
arbitrary to allow D's carriers to claim the traveler as primary justification
traffic when the contacts of the trip with B or C are equal to those with D.
7

e CAB Order No. E-17235 (July 27, 1961).
61Ibid.
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The CAB's definition would also add to the influence of the American
flag lines on the destination of tourist travel in Europe. If convenience
and frequency of service affect the tourist's decision about the countries
to visit, a reduction in the ability of the smaller countries to offer attractive service will also handicap efforts to attract tourists because American lines have tended to concentrate their schedules on the major gateways
such as London or Paris rather than the other cities such as Amsterdam or
Copenhagen. "
In the model discussed all four countries have an interest in the traffic
from B to C, and carriers from each country should be able to include the
traveler as primary justification traffic carried. The language of Article
Ten permits such classification easily for the carriers of A and D, and it
is unlikely that either B or C would object to classifying him as third or
fourth freedom traffic for their carriers. While the language of the bilaterals might be redrafted to give explicit recognition to the interest of
B or C in both legs touching that country, origin and destination can be
read as having a dual meaning referring to either the trip origin and destination or the segment origin and destination.
Even this interpretation will be arbitrary in some cases. In a circular
journey, in which stopovers of approximately equal duration are made
at four countries B, C, D, and E, the passenger's true destination cannot
be said to be any single country. If such a trip were from the United
States to Europe, the A-B and E-A segments across the Atlantic would be
the most important. Following the CAB interpretation, A and D (the
most distant country) could consider the traveler as primary justification.
The interpretation suggested in considering the first model examined
would include the interests of B and E in their respective segments. Neither
recognizes C's interest in the trans-Atlantic flight even though the traveler,
in his own mind, may be visiting C as much as any of the other three
countries. To admit C's interest in the A-B leg would leave little of the
original division of traffic between third-fourth freedom and fifth freedom; the relevant points would become the regions of origin and destination-a change beyond the scope of the present agreements. Nor does
the suggested interpretation reflect the interest a carrier's country has in
the service of transportation as an end in itself. Recognition of this interest disregards the continued rejection of commercial freedom of the air
and the implied qualification in the Bermuda-Type Agreements that the
commercial rights granted are divided into third, fourth, and fifth freedoms."° Thus to acknowledge C's interest in either the trans-Atlantic segments or the interest in the service of transportation is inappropriate
under the Bermuda-Type Agreements as now written.
If a stopover in a country creates a segment destination and origin, and
determines whether the traveler is primary justification traffic on the
touching segments for the carriers of that country, stopover must be
defined. The speed of modern planes has brought all but the longest
69 See testimony of James C. Buckley, pp. 19-20, and Exhibits KLM R-19, R-20, CAB Investigation. On the other hand, it has been charged that the excessive capacity carried by the
foreign lines inhibits the development of American flag. In 1963 Pan American announced that it
would expand coverage to several other cities, particularly Copenhagen, Brussels, and Amsterdam,
a development which should test this charge.
70See arts. 2, 10, supra notes 25-26; cf. International Air Transport Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944,
art. 1, 59 Stat. 1701, E.A.S. No. 488.
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flights within the limits of endurance of most travelers. Consequently
where non-stop service is available, any stop may represent an interest in
the way station, and perhaps simply passing through customs ought to
constitute a stopover. But a definition allowing stops for only a few hours
to be classified as stopovers would offer too great an opportunity for
evasion of the requirement that the country have some contact beyond
the interest in the transportation itself. Yet because a tourist may spend
two days or less in several countries on a tour," the duration of a stopover
cannot be very long. Twenty-four hours, though arbitrary, appears to
accommodate all but the shortest of tourist stops and provides sufficient
interruption to deter use for through traffic. It would not be necessary to
require a stay long enough to ensure that the traveler would have visited
the country regardless of the frequencies offered. A stay of twenty-four
hours indicates some desire to visit or do business in the country and would
provide sufficient contact."

IV.

THE DISADVANTAGES

OF UNILATERAL ACTION

Should the Civil Aeronautics Board be successful in its attempt to
establish its power to control capacity, other nations would be encouraged
to be less hesitant about acting unilaterally to protect national carriers
from competition. At present international aviation problems are dealt
with in a narrow perspective with national flag lines seeking government
protection whenever threatened with commercial setbacks.
This tendency was especially noticeable when jet aircraft were being
introduced. It quickly became clear that even turbo-props could not
compete with the jets. In many cases where the national flag line was not
yet ready to introduce jets, the government took steps to prevent fullfledged competition by other lines. Italy refused to permit Pan American
to fly jets into the Rome airport unless a surcharge was added to the regular
fare." Great Britain which had tolerated Pan American one-stop flights
from New York to Jamaica under a grandfather-route clause in the
Bermuda Agreement suddenly insisted that all passengers change planes
at the stopover. They alleged that the operations before the Bermuda
Agreement had been different and that the grandfather clause did not
cover the present operations.4
Unilateral action by the United States to restrict operations of other
countries according to an American definition of the fifth-freedom clauses
would no doubt invite similar actions by other countries. Thus in Asia
and South America it is the American carriers which are criticized for
excessive fifth-freedom operations,75 and the favored local interpretation
71 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 1, 1962,

§

10, p. 28, col. 1 (BOAC advertisement for sixteen

day tour visiting eight countries).
7 The time can only be arbitrary in the absence of empirical data. It may be that tourist
or business stops of only a few hours are sufficiently frequent to require a time of only a few
hours for a segment destination.
" See Business Note, 189 Economist 440 (1958); Business Note, 190 Economist 155 (1959).
74
See N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1960, § 2, p. 1, col. 1; see Business Note, 194 Economist 132
(1960). A year earlier, BOAC had induced the British government to stop KLM's flights to
Singapore after KLM rights in Indonesia had been terminated. Business Note, 190 Economist 244
(1959).
71 See, e.g., Aerolineas Peruanas, S.A., CAB, Docket 12714 (complaint that Panagra is carrying excessive fifth-freedom traffic).
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operates to restrict American operations. Unilateral action by the CAB
would encourage countries feeling aggrieved by American operations to
retaliate. Regardless of the net effect of such a series of restrictions on the
share of the traffic carried by American carriers, such restrictions would
curtail the growth heretofore enjoyed by American carriers.
The precedent of unilateral interpretation of the bilateral agreements
would have further serious consequences if other nations sought to develop restrictions based on a theory of regional cabotage. International
traffic, the basis of the commercial rights granted in Articles Two and
Ten, is not defined and could easily be interpreted to exclude traffic within
the region."6 The possibility of organizing air traffic within some regions
as a unit has been discussed, but it would seem that any reorganization
along regional lines ought to be the subject of negotiations in which the
United States can receive other compensating advantages if the commercial rights must be yielded."
One advantage of the bilaterals is thought to be flexibility for each
agreement can be tailored to the individual needs of the signatories. In
attempting to impose its definition upon all carriers simultaneously, the
CAB is creating a united opposition and ignoring the advantages of a
case-by-case development of a new principle. Any agreed definition of
fifth-freedom traffic, whether it is that proposed by the CAB or one similar
to the construction suggested in this article, should be developed by amendments to the bilaterals making explicit the meaning to be attached to
Article Ten.
The United States will probably be under continuing pressure to grant
increased landing rights, for which it has had little to ask in exchange in
the past. Such negotiations would seem an appropriate place to insist on
the insertion of a definition of fifth-freedom traffic which recognizes the
four interests in an intermediate segment but which excludes carriage
where the only national interest is in the carriage itself. It has been reported that the United States has offered to exchange landing rights on
the West Coast, requested by Alitalia and KLM, in return for acceptance
of the straight American interpretation." As of yet there is no indication
that either has accepted. In the long run, the advantages of the new stops
and the pressure of direct capacity discussions 9 may lead to acceptance.
In the meantime the rejection of the United States offer itself relieves some
of the pressure on American aviation. ° If the CAB feels that unilateral
action must be taken in retaliation for similar restrictions on American
carriers" or if the violations of one carrier are so serious as to outweigh
" Cf. Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., 1A Av. L. Rep. 5 22262 (CAB 1959).
"7See Hearings on InternationalAir TransportationProblems, supra note 53, at 7-8. Either party
can, of course, force negotiations by denouncing the treaty, but the United States has never
seemed to feel such a course was advantageous.
"SSee Aviation Week, April 24. 1961, p. 38 (proposed offer to KLM); id., June 26, 1961, p.
45 (offer to Italy).
" The first attempt at adjusting disagreements through direct negotiations, made with the
Scandinavian countries, was unsuccessful. Testimony of Joseph C. Watson, pp. 7-8, CAB
Investigation.
s" See Task Force 111: "Among these are rights to populous metropolitan areas in the heart of
the country which not only result in increased competition with U. S. international operations,
but also dilute domestic trunkline business. Every transpolar route grant from the West Coast to
Europe represents some drain on U. S. transcontinental business."
"' See Rebuttal Exhibit BC-2, pp. 2-3, CAB Investigation.
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the disadvantages of unilateral action, they could initiate unilateral action
to amend the particular permit as appropriate for the individual case."

82 The CAB, in justifying the possibility of unilateral action, has noted the unfairness which
results when a foreign government restricts an American carrier or delays approval of changes
in the carrier's operations. Even if the difficulties are eventually resolved by negotiation, the
American carrier is restricted during the interim while the foreign carrier is not. Testimony of
Joseph C. Watson, p. 6, CAB Investigation; see Hearings on International Air Transportation
Problems, supra note 53, at 24. The arguments for quick action are strongest in such a case,
but the proposed conditions are not phrased restrictively and permit summary imposition of
capacity limitations in any case. See Proposed Reg. 213, 26 Fed. Reg. 796 (1961). The need for
prompt action is not so apparent when a carrier is thought to be offering excess capacity or carrying an undue amount of fifth-freedom traffic, and there seems to be little reason to discard the
procedural safeguards afforded by a full hearing and presidential review of the proposed conditions.
See Federal Aviation Act §§ 402(f), 801, 72 Stat. 758, 782, 49 U.S.C. §§ 402, 801 (1958).

